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I. Introduction
In the iconic movie When Harry Met Sally, the main characters live their lives 
in separate, albeit overlapping, orbits. Content through most of their young 
adult lives to pursue their separate journeys, they fi nd their mutual fate only 
when their orbits collide, and they merge their lives. The movie is a he said/she 
said account; Harry and Sally recall the evolution of their relationship through 
the lens of perspectives unique to each. The viewer understands the richness of 
the story only because those perspectives are presented together. 
Is there a lesson here for those seeking to improve their law school 
curriculum? Bringing together diff erent viewpoints is one of the callings and 
challenges of legal education. We often think of this calling in terms of teaching 
students how to recognize the diff erent roles and views of the people involved 
(or excluded) in litigating a case. But law students must also become adept at 
understanding how various bodies of law interact—supporting, balancing, and 
even confl icting with each other. Just as the people and institutions involved in 
litigation bring diff erent values and history to social problems, so too diff erent 
areas of law bring with them rich historical and policy traditions. As others 
have noted,1 teaching students isolated areas of law leaves students unprepared 
for practice. When we teach students how the separate topics they study in law 
school fi t together, they can better put abstract concepts into practical use and 
recognize overarching concepts that animate many diff erent areas of the law.
This article describes an attempt to achieve these goals by merging two 
canonical fi rst-year courses, civil procedure and torts, into an integrated class 
titled Introduction to Civil Litigation. Our most pressing motivation was 
concern that students who study civil procedure and torts in isolation develop 
a skewed, unrealistic view of how law works in the real world. By combining 
these courses, we hoped to teach students early in their careers to approach 
problems more like practicing lawyers, who must deal with multiple bodies of 
1. See, e.g., Kris Franklin, Do We Need Subject Matter-Specifi c Pedagogies?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 839, 861 
(2016).
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law simultaneously. And while the course did yield a higher level of practice 
readiness, the experience also brought unexpected rewards to both students 
and faculty. As we developed and refi ned the course, we discovered that we 
were not just merging two courses. We were bringing together two diff erent 
perspectives on how the law functions. We came to believe that more can be 
gained by viewing torts and civil procedure together than by studying them 
apart. Like Harry and Sally, torts and civil procedure tell diff erent sides of the 
same story.
The insights gleaned after four years teaching the merged civil litigation 
course are potentially useful to faculty teaching torts or civil procedure, 
whether the instruction is delivered in an integrated or traditional course 
setting. Part II of the article briefl y recounts the odyssey of our decision to 
merge torts and civil procedure into one integrated course. Part III describes 
how we used the course to broaden student understanding of foundational 
doctrines through the interweaving of procedural and substantive law. In Part 
IV, we discuss how our approach to the course facilitated active, contextual 
learning and introduced students to both practical applications and bar-type 
assessments. Finally, Part V lays the groundwork for the future of our noble 
experiment and off ers some suggestions to colleagues in the academy who 
might consider teaching a similar course or enhancing a stand-alone course.
Kris Franklin’s recent piece in the Journal of Legal Education calls for law 
teachers to consider both how their individual courses can best convey the 
essential concepts that students need to understand about a particular fi eld 
and more broadly how the course fi ts within the “ ‘gorgeous mosaic’ of the 
law itself.”2 She posits that “each law school class [has] something unique to 
contribute to the larger enterprise of teaching law students the process of law 
itself,” and suggests that law schools might better capture those contributions 
by coordinating among courses in the curriculum.3 Our project begins to 
answer that call in a concrete, and, we believe, fruitful way. 
II.  A Civil Union
Critics in and out of the legal academy have long bemoaned the relative 
dearth of practical training provided by the traditional Langdellian curriculum, 
with its emphasis on case studies of appellate opinions and relegation of 
practical skills to courses often taught by nontenure-track and adjunct faculty.4 
2. Id. at 861. The “gorgeous mosaic” phrase is a reference to New York Mayor David Dinkins’s 
imagery describing cultural integration in the city. See The Mosaic Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 
1990, at A18. Professor Franklin intriguingly uses the phrase to describe the richness and 
complexity of the law as an overarching system that law students need to understand to be 
fully prepared as attorneys.
3. Franklin, supra note 1, at 862 (Professor Franklin notes that “[f]ollowing the principles of 
intentional design, the more we articulate the ways each of the core academic subjects in law 
school adds to students’ overall learning, the more we can tailor our teaching to accentuate 
those features.” (footnote omitted)).
4. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 621 
(2008).
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The ABA’s MacCrate Report sounded an alarm that has been repeated many 
times since its 1992 publication .5 Legal employers now demand that new 
hires bring with them better training in the nuts and bolts of law practice.6 
Law schools have responded by including more practical experiences in 
their curricula and by infusing practice-oriented exercises into foundational 
courses. Nonetheless, the actual structure of the fi rst-year curriculum has yet 
to undergo a signifi cant and sustained change.7 Some schools have added 
coursework or merged a writing course with a doctrinal subject,8 but the 
great majority of fi rst-year students will encounter separate silos of doctrinal 
content, each subject formally cast as a universe unto itself.
Breaking with the time-honored structure of the fi rst year took a leap of 
faith. While it seems intuitively true that the silos of fi rst-year courses create 
an artifi cial legal world for students, breaking down and merging traditionally 
distinct courses required a reevaluation of the content of each course. Indeed, 
we discovered that teaching the integrated courses, particularly because the 
three of us had long taught one course but not the other, caused us to think 
very diff erently about subjects regarding which we had considered ourselves 
experts.
Most teachers of civil procedure struggle to explain enough of the substantive 
context of the cases they teach to make the procedural holdings salient to their 
students. And torts teachers struggle with having to explain the procedural 
posture of torts cases. We expected that our approach would diminish these 
problems, and it did, but the lessons we learned went far beyond those limited 
benefi ts. We discovered that combining the courses gave students a better, 
more realistic understanding of the systemic operations of legal institutions.
5. See TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 
(1992); Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 744, 761 (2016) 
(describing the call to action, including the need for “context-based” learning); David B. 
Oppenheimer, Using a Simulated Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: The Ninety-Percent Solution, 65 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 817, 819 (2016) (“The MacCrate report, the Carnegie report, Best Practices 
for Legal Education, Transforming the Education of Lawyers, and many articles published 
here in our peer-reviewed Journal of Legal Education and elsewhere encourage us to provide our 
students with opportunities to simulate or practice lawyering skills.” (footnotes omitted)).
6. See, e.g., Sean Patrick Farrell, The Lincoln Lawyers: Bypassing Law School on Your Way to the Bar, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014, at 22; Peter A. Joy, Law Schools and the Legal Profession: A Way Forward, 47 
AKRON L. REV. 177, 179–80 (2014).
7. See Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 760 (“While [law schools] have expanded upper-division 
off erings to include more practical-skills classes and problem-solving courses, the fi rst-year 
curriculum (and teaching of that curriculum) has generally changed little.”); Michael B. 
Mushlin & Lisa Margaret Smith, The Professor and the Judge: Introducing First-Year Students to 
the Law in Context, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 460, 462 (2014) (“The fi rst year of law school, and 
particularly the fi rst semester, with a few notable exceptions, remains unchanged at most 
schools.” (footnote omitted)).
8. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 821 n.25 (surveying law schools that combine writing 
and civil procedure).
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A.  Developing the Course
We chose to combine civil procedure with torts in part because many of the 
major civil procedure cases are based on an underlying tort claim. In practice, 
this occasional subject-matter overlap provided some convenience in teaching 
but was not a major benefi t. The best part of combining the subjects was the 
way the accessibility of torts provided familiar ground on which to scaff old 
less accessible procedural doctrines. The media frequently report on claims of 
fraud, product defects, and high-profi le wrongful-death actions. Most people 
have experienced a tort, whether litigated or not, in the form of a car accident 
or defective product. And, thanks to contingency fees in personal-injury cases, 
tort litigation reaches many who would not otherwise engage the judicial 
system. Tort lawyers are almost as common on television as criminal lawyers. 
The prominence of torts in pop culture provides both a familiar entry point 
and a sharp contrast to the less accessible world of civil procedure.
Some of our colleagues vehemently opposed integrating torts with civil 
procedure in one course, worried that the course would be more than fi rst-
year students could handle. Interestingly, when we spoke with practicing 
attorneys and second- and third-year law students about the course, they 
were overwhelmingly positive, saying, “I wish I had learned civil procedure 
like that.” They felt, in particular, that teaching civil procedure in a vacuum 
made it too abstract to be useful; they did not understand how important civil 
procedure was until they tried to use it in a practical setting.
Ultimately, the doubters and the believers were both right—to a degree.9 
Especially in the beginning, students struggled to fi nd continuity as we 
moved from a torts topic to a civil procedure topic and back again; certainly, 
for the professors, teaching the integrated course took extra time (partially 
because there was no ready-made casebook or syllabus).10 Those students who 
surmounted these issues were able to better understand the way substantive 
law and procedural law are necessarily linked. Their depth of knowledge 
also increased through practical exercises and assessments that required an 
understanding of both areas of law at once.
At fi rst, we structured the course by teaching a civil procedure topic followed 
by a congruent torts topic, followed by a practicum that required students to 
use both areas of law in a single project. We would then study a new set of 
torts and civil procedure topics, followed by a practicum that attempted to 
pull together all the topics that we had covered so far in the course. Over time, 
9. Student responses to the course varied over four years. In anonymous course evaluations, 
students often identifi ed civil litigation as their most diffi  cult fi rst-year course. This could 
suggest that the course was too much for fi rst-year students or that they were challenged 
and grew to meet expectations. Many also described it as their favorite class. The fi rst year 
we taught the course, some students commented in surveys that torts and civil procedure 
should be taught separately. These comments varied in future years. We describe here what 
seemed to work best based on student feedback and our own impressions.
10. We created a syllabus and a custom casebook (described in more detail below) that combined 
torts and civil procedure materials from other texts.
267
we tweaked the order of topics to better leverage synergies and to balance the 
relative diffi  culty of the subjects. Also, we refi ned the practicums, integrated 
them more into the substantive aspects of the course, and increasingly used the 
same underlying fact scenarios as simulations to attack topics from diff erent 
angles.11 By the third time we taught the course, the torts and procedure topics 
seemed to fi t together naturally.
B.  Unexpected Second Order Effects
One of the best parts of uniting these courses, for us, was the way it expanded 
our perspective on the topics we thought we knew. Two of us have taught civil 
procedure for many years (but not torts) and the third has taught torts for 
many years (but not civil procedure). To get up to speed, we met regularly to 
brief each other on the subjects and coordinate teaching approaches. 
We realized quickly that as faculty members with focused areas of expertise, 
we had become unnecessarily and unhealthily siloed. As professors, we know 
what we know and have explained it enough times that it makes perfect sense to 
us. In explaining our well-worn topics to a colleague, we discovered that years 
of teaching had led us to approach the law from very diff erent perspectives. 
Our own reactions as we ventured outside our academic comfort zones gave 
us a better appreciation for the challenges students face when attempting to 
digest these diff erent bodies of law. 
For those of us who had taught civil procedure but not torts, for example, 
the fi eld of torts initially seemed frustratingly squishy. Having taught the 
historical development of doctrines mainly through United States Supreme 
Court cases, the proceduralists among us struggled to fi nd coherence in 
an array of tort cases drawn from many diff erent state courts, each with no 
obligation to follow the reasoning of other state courts or even that of such 
infl uential institutions like the American Law Institute. Also troubling was the 
lack of a consistent lexicon in torts. Terms like cause in fact, proximate cause, 
duty, and breach can have diff erent meanings for diff erent courts, and even 
among diff erent jurists on the same court. And though students must learn 
well-established tort “elements” in any torts class, those elements are far from 
distinct. Duty bleeds into breach, breach into causation.12 Element “creep” 
matters greatly to the proceduralist, who is keenly aware that the division of 
11. We also found that assigning students a practicum before studying a topic helped to focus 
students’ attention. As with the familiar “treasure hunt” approach, students engaged with 
material by looking for answers to mock clients’ concrete questions and needs. This, of 
course, better mimics the practice of law.
12. Of course, from the perspective of a torts professor, the apparent disorder of tort doctrine 
is what makes it great for teaching legal reasoning. In torts we attempt to fi nd uniform 
rules across a fi eld of diverse cases, and in the process draw arguments and policy rationales 
from a deep pool of common-law thought. In torts, there is rarely a “right” answer to a 
legal question; instead there are but guideposts that can be used to test students’ ability to 
think critically and recognize unconscious assumptions. Students practice being counselors, 
identifying strong and weak arguments, as we spin hypotheticals that slightly alter the facts.
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decision-making authority between judge and jury varies according to the 
element.
Those of us who had taught torts but not civil procedure often found the 
procedure cases simultaneously rigid and indecisive. In studying personal 
jurisdiction, for example, the cases purport to be asserting a consistent 
philosophy—due process—yet over time the rules shift and are redefi ned by the 
Supreme Court. History eclipses doctrine as the Court circumlocutes prior 
cases to catch up with social, economic, and philosophical changes in society. 
Far from the fl exibility of the common law, civil procedure demands uniform 
application of its rules and statutes within all geographies of the federal courts. 
Additionally, for a torts professor who is used to teaching that legal questions 
rarely have a “right” answer, it was disorienting to fi nd that, particularly when 
it comes to codifi ed civil procedure rules, there often is a right answer to 
procedural questions.
We were surprised to fi nd how often our diff erent doctrinal predilections 
aff ected how we taught the subjects. The procedure teachers found themselves 
focusing on decision points and due-process problems that would otherwise 
receive little attention in a torts course. Those who have spent more time 
studying common-law claims could not help but question the venerable 
line of civil procedure cases that propound far-reaching federal policies that 
sometimes fail to provide individual justice. The collaborative process of 
creating the course evoked new perspectives, challenged the assumptions we 
made in teaching our courses, and helped us better understand why students 
struggle to fi nd connections in these two distinct, yet interconnected areas 
of law.13 We found that while there is value in teaching courses in our areas 
of expertise, broadening our understanding enabled us to deliver a more 
balanced perspective to students. 
III.  Substantive Integration: Leveraging Congruences and Conflicts 
Merging torts and civil procedure compels students to recognize the ways 
that tort law and civil procedure inevitably intersect in the practice of law. 
One cannot litigate a torts case without knowledge of court procedures, and 
court procedures have no meaning without a theory for relief. But beyond 
this practical connection, the substantive doctrines of tort law often animate 
the rules and policies that propel civil procedure. We attempted to leverage 
the inherent practical and doctrinal interactions between these two bodies of 
law to give the concepts depth. Where the law merges, we helped students 
fi nd cohesion. Where the law confl icts, we found opportunities to sharpen 
distinctions. 
By expressly noting the places where civil procedure and tort law intersect—
and more importantly the interdependence of the two bodies of law—we sought 
to give students a well-rounded understanding of how the law functions. We 
13. On several occasions throughout the semester we held “joint” classes of all of our students 
and took turns leading the class on a topic on which we had a particular expertise. By doing 
so, we modeled collaboration and professional respect and civility to our students.
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found the most profound pedagogical connections came in teaching four 
recurring themes: a) the function and challenges of federalism; b) attempts 
to provide fair limits on a defendant’s liability and amenability to suit; c) 
the importance of the identity of the decision-maker; and d) the impact of 
procedural posture in evaluating the merits of a case.
A.  Facts, Federalism, and Forum Shopping 
Teaching torts and civil procedure in one course gave us unique opportunities 
to help students more fully appreciate the practical import of federalism. As 
students repeatedly encountered tort claims that vary from state to state and 
due-process mandates that permeate all U.S. courts, they learned to recognize 
the diff erent functions and powers of the state and federal court systems. In 
the combined course, we pointed out and tested these distinctions by asking 
students to explain the impact a case would have on other courts faced with 
similar facts in diff erent jurisdictions. 
Early in the course, students noticed a stylistic diff erence between torts 
and civil procedure cases. The foundational civil procedure cases students 
read in their fi rst year tend to be long and deep, often written by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and are thick on policy and thin on facts. Because these cases 
address rules and concepts that have nationwide implications, the policy 
considerations often take precedence over the particular dispute that happens 
to have brought the case to the forum.14
As we shifted topics, students found torts cases are often the opposite.15 
Signifi cant shifts in doctrine rarely come through a single case in a single 
jurisdiction and (unless free speech is involved)16 do not carry the voice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In torts cases, the facts are the main event; it often 
seems that the rules are twisted and torn to meet the more immediate demands 
of local, particularized justice. Courts are free to distinguish similar cases 
based on small factual diff erences, or even a mere diff erence in perspective. 
Torts jargon is often expressed diff erently from case to case, requiring students 
to accept that decisions don’t always mean what they say; in some places, a 
court means “cause in fact” even though it says “proximate cause,”17 assault 
and battery are two diff erent torts even though some courts use the terms 
14. For a famous example, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (plaintiff , who lost 
his arm by walking on a path next to railroad tracks, had his $30,000 jury verdict overturned 
in a deeply philosophical opinion in which the Supreme Court only tangentially recounted 
the facts).
15. The stylistic diff erences can frustrate students if they try to read and brief both kinds of cases 
the same way. We found it helpful to give students guidance in advance on how to approach 
the cases. Specifi cally, in torts cases students should be working to synthesize general rules 
and exceptions that span jurisdictions. In procedure cases, students should be looking for 
shifts and clarifi cations as they piece together the historical development of doctrines. 
16. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920); Haft v. Lone Palm 
Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 468 (Cal. 1970); Zalazar v. Vercimak, 633 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (Ill. App. 
1993); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d. 1, 2 (Cal. 1948).
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interchangeably,18 and “intent” has various meanings depending on which tort 
is being alleged.19
As students encountered these stylistic diff erences, we drew their attention 
to an underlying lesson about federalism. The reason torts cases can slide 
from one voice to another is that the voices belong to separate sovereigns. 
Because each state is free, in our judicial system, to develop its tort law within 
very loose constitutional constraints,20diff erent states can and do reach wildly 
diff erent conclusions on similar facts. Yet procedural law, even as applied in 
state courts, is much more tightly constrained by the federal Constitution. 
For example, due process, a major theme in fi rst-year procedure, imposes 
requirements on state sovereigns when they seek to exercise power over tort 
defendants. Thus, a state court may have the power to choose whether to 
impose tort liability, but must conform to federal requirements as to whether it 
can subject a tort defendant to its power in the fi rst place.21 Understanding this 
dichotomy is useful to students, practitioners, and faculty alike. Students learn 
that in both tort and procedural law settings, clients need to be advised to 
structure their behavior to avoid liability for claims in their home jurisdiction 
and in jurisdictions that have unfavorable laws. As students repeatedly see 
the interaction between tort claims that vary from state to state and due-
process mandates that permeate all U.S. courts, they more fully appreciate the 
functions of federalism.
B.  Conquering the Enigmatic “F” Word 
In tort law, the word “foreseeable” does far more work than any single 
word should be expected to do.22 Torts professors spend considerable time 
attempting to unwind the mystery of that overused and ill-defi ned word. 
We ask what must be foreseeable, to whom it must be foreseeable, and from 
18. See, e.g., Grabowski v. Quigley, 684 A.2d 610, 615 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Smith v. 
Yohe, 194 A.2d 167, 174 (Pa. 1963)).
19. See, e.g., PAULA J. MANNING, TORTS: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK, at 16 (“The required 
consequence [that must be intended] is diff erent for each of the intentional torts.”).
20. The U.S. Constitution’s constraints on the development of state tort law are very limited. 
See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), on punitive damages.
21. In addition, federal courts are subject to a uniform set of procedural rules, and a majority of 
state procedural systems model the federal rules.
22. Foreseeability comes up most prominently in discussing proximate cause, but issues of 
foreseeability lurk within the framework of other tort concepts, such as duty and breach. 
Famously, Palsgraf teaches that the railroad company whose employee helps a passenger 
onto a train, resulting in a package exploding, owes no duty to a woman standing farther 
down the platform because she is not a foreseeable plaintiff . Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). In another famous case, Judge Learned Hand slips “probability” 
into his cost-benefi t analysis of breach, United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 
(2d Cir. 1947), which inevitably morphs into foreseeable likelihood. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (Am. Law Inst. 2010). The Third 
Restatement of Torts retreats from using “foreseeability” in its test for proximate cause, 
instead invoking the “risks rule”; but that rule, the Restatement authors note, envelops the 
foreseeability rule that has long dominated proximate cause analysis. Id. at § 29 cmt.
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what point in time it should be measured. Because the word is so imprecise, 
torts professors often challenge students to explain proximate cause without 
resorting to the “F” word.23 
In teaching civil litigation, we found that comparing the tort concept of 
foreseeability with the “foreseeability” necessary for due-process analysis 
brought both concepts into greater relief. The comparison was helpful in two 
respects. First, students understood the individual doctrines better when they 
were required to articulate how the concepts functioned diff erently. Second, the 
doctrines made sense to students as they recognized a common-sense policy of 
fairness to the defendant that underlies “foreseeability” in both arenas.
After students had been challenged with the “F” word in studying negligence 
or products liability, we returned to the question in personal jurisdiction. A 
good starting point is the following passage from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, a staple of civil procedure courses:
Yet “foreseeability” alone has never been a suffi  cient benchmark for personal 
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.
. . . . 
. . . This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. 
But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere 
likelihood that a product will fi nd its way into the forum State. Rather, it is 
that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such 
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled [sic] into court there. 24
Parsing the Supreme Court’s language provides an opportunity to compare 
the tort conception of foreseeability with “the kind of foreseeability that is 
critical to due process analysis.”25 In both contexts, courts are attempting 
to identify fair limits on the burden that an imperfect judicial system places 
upon defendants. Yet in each context, foreseeability serves a diff erent master. 
The examples the Court gives in World-Wide of situations in which personal 
jurisdiction is absent make good hypotheticals to test whether students 
understand proximate cause:
If foreseeability were the criterion, a local California tire retailer could be 
forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there . . . ; a Wisconsin 
seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled [sic] before a distant court 
for damage caused in New Jersey . . . ; or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire 
could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries happening there . . . .26
One can easily come up with hypotheticals that illustrate the reverse: 
situations in which due process is satisfi ed and proximate cause prevents 
23. We intend this to mean “foreseeability,” though other words may come to mind in the stress 
of the moment.
24. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
25. Id. at 295, 297.
26. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
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liability.27 To push the distinction, one can ask students what a defendant can 
do to avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction in another state. Then ask 
what, if anything, that same defendant could do to avoid having plaintiff ’s 
damages fall within the limits of proximate cause. Students begin to see the 
diff erence between voluntary acts that make something “foreseeable” in the 
civil procedure context and the more abstract foreseeable harm that attaches 
when a defendant takes a negligent act. The “F” word is too ephemeral 
by itself to answer proximate-cause or minimum-contacts questions, but 
comparing its use in the two areas of law helps students see what is at stake 
beneath the language.28 More broadly, this comparison illustrates an important 
phenomenon that students must grasp in order to succeed at lawyering—
learning to distinguish when and how words do actual analytical work.29 
The discussion in both areas of law resonates with students as they see a 
common concern for fairness: A defendant should usually not be held liable 
for things beyond the defendant’s control. In personal jurisdiction, this 
means that one cannot be brought to a forum unless one has voluntarily done 
something to create a reasonable expectation of being haled into that court. In 
tort law—particularly negligence—this means that a defendant cannot be liable 
for harms that reach beyond what she should reasonably expect from the risks 
she has voluntarily taken. Exceptions and exigencies temper the doctrine in 
both areas of law, but between these is a concern that any student can relate to 
if she has felt the anxiety of being named as a defendant in a lawsuit.30
27. For example, due process is satisfi ed by “general jurisdiction” over a defendant, which for 
corporate defendants lies (at least) in their states of incorporation and principal places 
of business; yet liability for that defendant may not lie if the plaintiff  or the injury is not 
foreseeable.
28. A third form of foreseeability comes up in cases on respondeat superior. Arguably, this kind of 
foreseeability draws together concepts from both torts and civil procedure. See, e.g., Ira S. 
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171–72 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting 2 FOWLER 
V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 1376–78 (1956)) (“[W]hat is reasonably 
foreseeable in this context . . . is quite a diff erent thing from the foreseeably unreasonable 
risk of harm that spells negligence . . . . The foresight that should impel the prudent man 
to take precautions is not the same measure as that by which he should perceive the harm 
likely to fl ow from his long-run activity in spite of all reasonable precautions on his own part 
. . . . The employer should be held to expect risks, to the public also, which arise ‘out of and 
in the course of’ his employment of labor. ”).
29. First-year law students desperately need to be pushed beyond the cloak of language. Many 
of them have learned as undergraduates to digest and regurgitate terminology without 
challenging the meaning of the words. Disentangling and distinguishing foreseeability in 
diff erent settings helps students engage in critical thinking.
30. The concept also surfaces as a choice-of-law issue. Larry Kramer and others describe this 
phenomenon as the Constitution protecting citizens from unfair surprise. See generally HERMA 
HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, 
QUESTIONS (9th ed. 2013).
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C.  Reasonable People Acting Unreasonably
Questions about objectivity and reasonableness make for great discussions 
in torts and civil procedure courses. The combined course gave these issues 
greater depth. By applying the reasonable person test (of torts) to decisions 
the judge must make in dispositive motions before a jury verdict, we pushed 
students to become more cognizant of the importance of the identity (and 
potential biases) of the decision-maker. In addition, as students learned to 
recognize the diff erence between questions of law and questions of fact, they 
started to notice how often in the canonical torts cases jury questions are 
decided, for better or worse, by a judge.
We teach students that, in theory, the reasonable person is a refl ection of 
what a community realistically (or perhaps wishfully) expects of its citizens. 
In practice, however, the reasonable person inevitably absorbs some of the 
presumptions and prejudices of the dominant culture. A related inconsistency 
arises when students learn about a renewed motion for judgment as a matter 
of law (JML). Students who seem to identify with juries more than judges are 
appalled that the rules allow a judge to overturn a jury verdict if the judge 
determines that no “reasonable” jury could have reached the verdict that the jury 
just reached. The practical import of these doctrines can be brought together 
with a series of questions: How can a judge know that no “reasonable” jury 
could reach such a result? Does the “reasonable jury” refl ect the same qualities 
of the reasonable person in torts? Does the question of “reasonableness” serve 
the same community-values function in both contexts?
A good place to raise these questions is when torts damages are discussed 
within the context of juries, JML, and new trials. We have found success in 
having students put damages analysis into practice by taking on the role of a 
juror and, later, a judge. This exercise (discussed in greater detail below) gives 
students a more complete picture of how the civil justice system functions 
than they would have if torts and civil procedure were separate courses. The 
procedural rules for JML and new trial are more meaningful when students 
themselves have already come to a decision on the merits and must decide 
whether a diff erent conclusion still qualifi es as reasonable. Students are able 
to appreciate that these procedural devices diminish the right to jury trial. 
This, in turn, can lead to a fruitful discussion of the powerful potential eff ects 
of race, gender, and other factors on what counts as reasonable.31 At the same 
time, students are able to see the challenge juries face when attempting to 
apportion damages and come up with a proper verdict.
D.  Keeping Score
By the time law students are sitting anxiously in their seats on the fi rst day 
of law school, they are already tainted with the assumption that litigation ends 
31. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Essay, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil 
Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1994) (connecting the diminution of civil jury power through 
devices like JMLs to the increasing diversifi cation of civil juries in terms of gender and race).
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when one side wins and the other side loses.32 Students must learn to recognize 
the signifi cant yet sometimes subtle meaning of procedural posture. We found 
that we could more eff ectively emphasize the importance of procedural posture 
when students were studying civil procedure and torts in tandem.
From a merely practical standpoint, it is helpful for a professor teaching a 
torts case to know how far the students have delved into the stages of litigation. 
When we ask, “What is the procedural posture of this case?”, we know how far 
we can push students to explain whether the court assumed certain facts to be 
true for the sake of the motion, or whether those facts have been determined 
to be true by a fact-fi nder, or whether they are still in dispute. The holding of a 
case changes meaning when placed in procedural context. From here, one can 
spin hypotheticals that test the extent of precedent.
Of course, students start reading torts cases before they fully understand 
the signifi cance of procedural posture. It is necessarily an iterative process. 
One advantage of putting torts and civil procedure together, we have found, 
is that we can revisit procedural milestones again and again through the 
semester, digging deeper into the meaning of the torts cases as students better 
understand the stages of litigation. The many perspectives that bring meaning 
to a case—from the diff erent views of the parties to the policies underlying the 
legal doctrine—are harmonized as students better understand the parameters 
of the motion that led to the court’s decision.
We also explain to students that in civil litigation the quintessential skill of a 
lawyer is not the ability to make brilliant arguments but the ability to critically 
analyze the strength of a client’s case.33 Because the great majority of cases 
settle, litigators must make decisions about how far to go in litigation based 
upon what they believe to be the merits of their case. Most torts litigation and 
negotiation occurs in the shadow of the possibility of  jury trial,34 based upon 
assumptions about how the law might be interpreted in a given situation, 
which facts can be proven, and how a decision-maker is likely to react to 
the competing stories that the parties present. In this complex landscape of 
facts, precedent, forum preferences, and unknown variables, students need to 
understand how the procedural posture aff ects the merits of a claim.
32. This is, of course, wrong on many levels. From a therapeutic justice perspective, a case 
may result in no winners or only winners, depending on how litigation aff ects the parties. 
From an economic and business perspective, victory must be calculated as the least costly 
resolution, taking into account litigation costs and business reputation losses, as well as any 
damages award. Finally, from a procedural perspective, the signifi cance of a ruling depends 
largely on the litigation stage at which the court rendered its opinion. Thus, for example, 
when a defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied, this is only a small “win” for the plaintiff ; 
the plaintiff  may still lose on summary judgment or at trial. If the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss is granted, on the other hand, the impact is greater.
33. See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: 
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 33–35 (4th ed. 
2011).
34. See Jeff rey Abramson, Second-Order Diversity Revisited, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 738, 776–77 
(2014).
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IV.  Pedagogic Integration: More Pain, More Gain
In addition to the signifi cant theoretical congruences involved in 
integrating torts and civil procedure, we found the pedagogic techniques 
we implemented yielded benefi ts that were profound and systematic enough 
to warrant fi nding ways to overcome the challenges. Some of the resulting 
benefi ts we encountered are intrinsic to (or, at a minimum, easier to implement 
in) a course that combines torts and civil procedure. Others are not necessarily 
tied to integration, but serve to stimulate student comprehension and help 
students grow as independent, self-assessing learners. 
As many legal education reformers have noted, “[t]here is substantial 
literature establishing that providing students with context eff ectively 
promotes learning, as do active learning techniques and opportunities for 
formative assessment. ”35 As Professor Oppenheimer states, “Whether through 
simulation or clinical practice, our colleagues who study learning theory 
repeatedly urge us to use practical skills, context, and active learning as a 
method of teaching the essential intellectual and cognitive skills described 
by Shultz and Zedeck: analysis and reasoning, creativity and innovation, 
problem-solving, and practical judgment.”36
The most immediate benefi t of using torts to teach procedure is that it 
brings civil procedure into a realm that is more familiar and accessible to 
fi rst-year students. This makes possible active, context-based learning that is 
both deeper in analysis and more practical in application. We reinforced this 
context-based learning by using frequent essay and multiple-choice formative 
assessments, as well as practice-based exercises.
A.  Silos Just Aren’t Sexy 
As Professor Ho and colleagues have reminded us, “Studies show that 
students are better able to learn and master concepts that they learn in 
context, especially when learning in an integrated experience that mimics the 
professional experience.”37 One reason context improves comprehension is 
that it makes the material more interesting and accessible.38 
Teaching civil procedure in the context of torts helps students overcome the 
bewilderment that naturally occurs in a course that is in many ways alien to 
the common experience of most fi rst-year students.39  To add to the challenge, 
35. See, e.g., Cynthia Ho, Angela Upchurch & Susan Gilles, An Active-Learning Approach to Teaching 
Tough Topics: Personal Jurisdiction as an Example, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 772, 780 (2016).
36. Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 820.
37. Ho, Upchurch & Gilles, supra note 35, at 780 (footnote omitted).
38. Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional Law Curriculum Through 
Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 56–57 (2001).
39. Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 817. (“Two big sources of student frustration [with civil 
procedure] are (1) their inability to view the course materials in a context that makes 
them seem real, and (2) our failure to engage them through active learning.”); see also Ho, 
Upchurch & Gilles, supra note 35, at 777 (“The entire course of civil procedure is unusual 
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many of the substantive law claims at issue in civil procedure cases invoke 
topics reserved for second- or third-year study (e.g., securities regulation, 
employment discrimination, and qualifi ed immunity). Even the minimal—yet 
necessary—attention to the divergent substantive contexts of these cases can 
cause confusion and divert focus. 
Teaching in context also helps the learner because it situates the subject 
in a realm where the learner can more immediately and realistically practice 
applying the subject.40 Neatly packaging areas of law into separate courses 
results in at least two assumptions: fi rst, that legal problems will fall into only 
one of these areas and not the others; and second, that clients will somehow 
be able to identify for the lawyer what area of law is at issue (by saying, for 
example, “I have a products liability claim”). In reality, clients frequently seek 
assistance with problems that defy immediate categorization and often more 
than one type of law is involved. Moreover, civil procedure questions rarely 
show up on their own, and substantive torts issues require procedural action 
to obtain relief. By placing the two subjects in a context that more accurately 
tracks the way the subjects arise in the practice of law—that is, with substantive 
and procedural law necessarily intertwined—students can envision and put 
into practice the fundamental concepts of tort litigation. 
We also aided students in understanding how legal analysis operates 
in real-life lawsuits through a combination of discussing cases in the news, 
administering combination torts/civil procedure essay questions stemming 
from the same fact pattern, requiring the drafting of mock litigation 
documents using torts scenarios, and taking time in class to raise torts aspects 
of civil procedure cases and civil procedure aspects of torts cases. These 
activities helped overcome some students’ misconception that civil procedure 
involved only court documents and thus could not be tested in essay form, 
and the more widespread struggle with distinguishing between the analysis 
of torts problems (which tend to require an element-by-element inquiry) 
and civil procedure problems (which often require an open-ended, step-by-
step approach).41 To address students’ struggles with analytical diff erences 
in that it focuses on processes and not events, things or relationships. It is diffi  cult for 
students to visualize a process—especially when they have never participated in that process 
or observed others engaged in it.”).
40. See Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Refl ection in 
Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 317 (1994) (“The more a student becomes embedded 
in context as a legal worker, the more she wrestles enactively with the problematic events 
of the context, the more she subjects herself to the multiple forces of legal actors—clients, 
colleagues, opponents, supervisors, support staff , judges, or legislators—the more she . . . 
functions within particular legal institutions and ‘behavior settings’—law offi  ces, courts, bar 
associations, legislative bodies, and administrative agencies—the more she struggle [sic] to 
construct a comprehensible story about her new way of life, the more mature, measured, and 
eff ective her education and her practice is likely to become.”).
41. For example, in evaluating a claim for negligence, students must analyze each element of 
the claim—duty, breach, cause in fact, proximate cause, and damages. In contrast, when 
analyzing subject matter jurisdiction, the student should start with federal question 
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we provided structural guides for essay question analysis after completing 
course coverage of those topics. In addition, after administering our bar-type 
essay formative assessments (discussed below), we provided the students with 
very detailed rubrics (transparently revealing our expectations about how to 
address both torts and civil procedure topics), reviewed the basic rubric in 
class (as well as individually, on request), and required those who earned less 
than a “passing” score to re-take the exam. We also subsequently put a model 
answer on reserve in the library for students to check out and review. The 
combination of this time and attention to proper and appropriate analysis for 
topics in each subject generally yielded a substantially higher understanding 
of both the substance and the appropriate analytical structure. In fact, calling 
out the distinctions between element-by-element and step-by-step analysis 
actually strengthened the ability of students to do both.
Putting torts and procedure in context also seemed to discourage 
attitudinal barriers to student engagement. To their detriment, students tend 
to make blanket decisions about not liking or understanding a whole body 
of law—based primarily on their experience in a particular course. Taking a 
meta approach to civil procedure and torts illustrates that both topics concern 
representing clients to seek relief (or defend against it). And understanding 
strategic consequences of both procedural and tort liability theory choices 
broadens students’ perspectives. The world of civil litigation is deep and 
wide, and while some concepts may be more accessible than others, viewing 
the system as a whole helps students see it more realistically, making them 
less likely to simply decide that they don’t like (or understand) an entire fi rst-
year law topic. Avoiding such generalizations also leads to fewer self-defeating 
attitudes when choosing upper-level courses, studying for the bar exam, and 
making career decisions. 
B. Skin in the Game
The research is clear that “[s]tudents’ ability to learn is promoted by active 
rather than passive learning.”42 Active learning is defi ned as “students taking 
an active, more self-directed role in the learning process.”43 As Professor 
Lustbader notes, “[h]elping students ‘own’ the concepts not only is necessary 
as part of the cognitive process. It is essential in helping students resolve 
dissonances of culture and values, cope with emotionally charged situations, 
and feel a sense of inclusion.”44
We found that the synergy of teaching torts and civil procedure in one course 
made it easier to create realistic situations that evoke active learning than if they 
jurisdiction and proceed to diversity and supplemental jurisdiction only if federal question 
is not satisfi ed.
42. Ho, Upchurch & Gilles, supra note 35, at 782. 
43. Id.
44. Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Students Learn, 48 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 402, 408 (1998).
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were taught separately. Many civil procedure teachers have reported success 
having students learn through simulated litigation,45 and one of us has used 
this approach for many years. This technique is eff ective in large part because 
it transports students from being outside observers of the law to being active 
participants in the subject matter. As students become personally invested in 
the outcome of the litigation, they engage more deeply with the materials. 
Adding substantive tort doctrines into the simulation makes the exercise much 
deeper and more practical: Students are not just thinking strategically about 
the procedural tools and requirements; they are also scrutinizing the merits of 
the underlying tort claims. 
We used two recurring hypotheticals as simulations, one to introduce 
students to the nuts and bolts of asserting a claim, and the other to work 
strategically through the stages of a lawsuit as teams. The fi rst simulation 
was based upon a strange case in which a woman allegedly died as a result 
of a defective grocery bag.46 We introduced the facts of this simulation 
when studying products liability in the fi rst semester of the course. Later in 
the semester (after covering pleading), we assigned the students to draft a 
complaint based on the fact pattern. This tested the students’ understanding of 
products liability law as well as their ability to fi nd and apply the local rules for 
drafting, fi ling, and serving pleadings. More profoundly, the project provided 
a concrete illustration of the dilemma litigators face in attempting to meet the 
“Twiqbal” pleading standard.47 This pleading standard, which is mystifying 
in the abstract and challenging in practice, becomes more comprehensible 
when students apply it to a familiar substantive area of law.48 After students 
fi led their complaints, we had students switch to the role of the defendant and 
draft an answer to a randomly assigned complaint authored by one of their 
colleagues. They learned how to draft an answer, as well as how to evaluate the 
strength of potential affi  rmative defenses we had studied.49
The next semester, we returned to the same fact scenario as we addressed 
negligence, respondeat superior, and joinder. After adding more facts (purportedly 
45. See Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 821–28.
46. The fact scenario is derived from Amended Complaint, Freis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 
13-cv-268 (D. Neb. Apr. 4, 2014), ECF No. 47, 2014 WL 1496287. In that case, plaintiff  
alleged that his wife was injured when her Walmart grocery bag broke and the contents 
(including a large LaChoy can) fell on her right foot. The injury became infected, and 
after several attempts to treat the infection, the woman died. Id. Our simulation renames 
the plaintiff , adds a number of facts, and relocates the incident. Therefore, we did not have 
students review the pleadings from Freis.
47. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009).
48. See Bartholomew, supra note 5 at 765–70, for another practical method for teaching this 
standard.
49. Students who struggle with the diff erence between a defense and an affi  rmative defense in 
torts are helped by a pleading drafting exercise: The complaint asserts the prima facie case 
while the answer fi rst affi  rms or denies the prima facie case and then—usually in a separate 
section—alleges facts supporting affi  rmative defenses.
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learned in discovery), we assigned the students to draft a motion to amend the 
complaint from the fi rst term to name additional defendants and assert claims 
based upon negligence and respondeat superior. This exercise required both a 
review of the pleading and motion standards covered in the fi rst semester 
and the ability to distinguish between the elements of products liability and 
negligence. For many students who had struggled with one or more of these 
topics, drafting these documents (and the feedback they received on them) 
provided new clarity. And being required to succinctly and persuasively use 
the facts to plead the elements of negligence gave structure to a tort that often 
seems overwhelmingly complex and wide-ranging.
The second simulation we used was a negligence case based on a simple 
car accident. We placed students in small teams (or “fi rms”), assigned each 
to represent the plaintiff  or defendant, and had them take the case from 
initial disclosures through discovery and to settlement negotiations near 
the eve of trial. Each team was given a copy of the complaint and answer, 
as well as a confi dential set of documents, which ultimately forced them to 
evaluate the merits of their claims and make strategic decisions about how 
to craft and respond to discovery requests.50 The mock lawsuit yielded a 
number of pedagogical benefi ts, but chief among them was the way it taught 
the functional import of legal doctrines. Civil procedure professors and 
litigators are fascinated by the use of strategy in litigating a case. Students, 
however, rarely get to this level of enjoyment because they are so enmeshed in 
learning what often seems to them arcane procedural rules. But by assigning 
the students to “litigate” a mock negligence lawsuit (as well as other practical 
exercises combining torts and civil procedure), our students were able to 
appreciate the kinds of strategic choices and risks litigators encounter. For 
example, when we covered in class a topic as putatively “boring” as the work 
product doctrine, our students were fully engaged, since they knew it would 
matter in terms of which documents they could withhold from the opposing 
party when responding to discovery requests. Giving students the opportunity 
to behave as real-life litigators (who can appreciate both the procedural and 
substantive aspects of the case) during their fi rst year of study energized them 
and enhanced their understanding and appreciation of the higher levels of 
procedural practice.
C.  Show Me the Money
Beyond full simulations, we looked for bridges that reinforced concepts 
in one area of law while moving into a diff erent area. These often arose when 
50. We also gave them copies of some charts from Professor Woodley’s book on litigation in 
federal court. ANN E. WOODLEY, LITIGATING IN FEDERAL COURT: A GUIDE TO THE RULES (2d 
ed. 2014), pp. 62, 66–69, 82, 31–140, 159, 161. The students participated in discovery (initial 
disclosures, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents), we conducted live 
depositions of the plaintiff  and defendant during class (with the professors acting as counsel 
and volunteer students playing the roles of the parties), and then they engaged in settlement 
negotiations. 
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discussing the procedural posture of a tort case.51 Having directly addressed 
dispositive motions and the varying burdens, we were able to add teaching 
moments in real time. While coverage concerns prevented full discussions 
of civil procedure issues in every torts case (and vice versa), we strategically 
used this technique of looping back to previously covered procedural topics 
and foreshadowing those yet to come. 52 For example, after studying summary 
judgment, we paused during the coverage of a tort issue raised by summary 
judgment to explore the procedural context and compare it with other 
procedural mechanisms. Students were able to recognize that the procedural 
context and the decision-maker could have a signifi cant impact on the results.
The most fruitful exercises, however, were ones that brought together torts 
and civil procedure concepts that are intrinsically linked in practice. The 
study of juries, JML, and new trials, for example, has greater meaning when 
placed in the context of tort damages, including comparative fault. Using the 
famous McDonald’s hot coff ee case, which tends to evoke strong opinions and 
challenge popular misconceptions,53 we had the students work through each 
of these procedural mechanisms by moving between playing the role of the 
jury and the role of the judge.
First, after discussing comparative fault and the various types of damages, we 
put the students into groups that functioned as juries, and had them deliberate 
on the apportionment of liability among the parties. Students were required 
to reach a verdict on the percentage of fault attributable to each party. Then, 
after debriefi ng the fi rst jury experience and polling students for their various 
verdicts, we gave the them a (partially fi ctional) breakdown of the harms 
plaintiff  suff ered and a second verdict form that required students to assess the 
appropriate compensation for the plaintiff ’s various harms—including medical 
expenses, pain and suff ering, and lost wages. After the juries deliberated, 
we once again polled the class and debriefed the way students calculated 
51. Early in the course, we used an active-learning exercise to introduce the stages of litigation. 
We put the class in groups and gave each group a set of strips of paper—each of which 
had a litigation stage typed on it—and had the groups race to put the strips of paper in the 
proper order (and be able to explain why). Particularly for kinesthetic learners, this exercise 
was enlightening, and it formed the foundation for later discussions about the procedural 
posture of each case.
52. This is consistent with the “spiral curriculum” approach. See Maranville, supra note 38, at 
61–62; Paul Maharg, Professional Legal Education in Scotland, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 947, 960 
(2004).
53. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated sub nom, Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. 
CV-93-02419 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994), 1994 WL 16777704. This case, in which Liebeck 
claimed McDonald’s sold coff ee that was far too hot, became famous during tort reform 
campaigns in the 1990s. See, e.g., John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Confl ict: The 
Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1053 n.148 (2005). The case was 
later the subject of a documentary fi lm. HOT COFFEE (HBO 2013). The facts of the case—
and the court’s remittitur reducing the punitive damages to under $500,000—often come 
as a surprise to students. See Grant H. Morris, Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational 
Experience of First-Year Law Students, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465, 511–12 (2010).
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the damages—always an enlightening perspective into how jury verdicts can 
diverge.54
Next, we had the students play the role of a judge. We gave them examples 
of various (fi ctional) verdicts on the hot coff ee case—some self-contradicting, 
some clearly one-sided, and some that fell more toward the center. We had 
them assume that a party had moved for a renewed JML or, in the alternative, 
for a new trial. For each verdict, the student judges had to decide whether to 
let the verdict stand as is, grant a renewed motion for JML, or grant a new 
trial. As students explained their rulings, they were able to see where their 
ideas of reasonableness on the underlying tort diverged from or merged with 
others in the class. Procedural devices like JML and new trial look diff erent 
when “reasonableness” is revealed as an unknown quality. Adding to this, 
students saw that the amount of damages (as well as apportionment of fault) 
can vary drastically based upon the decision-maker. As students experienced 
the practical interaction of torts and procedure, they better appreciated the 
subtle and often confl icting roles of the lawyers, the decision-makers, and the 
rule of law. 
D.  Bar Prep, Issue Spotting, and True Grit 
One risk of moving back and forth between two areas of law is that students 
will have a lapse in concentration and thereby miss the transition from one 
subject to the next. To decrease the risk of this—and as part of a general desire 
to infuse bar-style assessments into our teaching—we gave students frequent 
bar-style assessments, some of which were graded and others that were purely 
formative.
During both semesters, we gave students several practice multiple-choice 
and essay questions, weekly multiple-choice quizzes, midterm and fi nal exams, 
and separate bar essay quizzes taken under timed conditions. The bar quizzes 
were modeled after the Uniform Bar Exam Multistate Essay Examination 
(MEE) questions. We graded each bar essay using a detailed rubric that 
included both individual points (with comments) and an overall MEE score 
(using the bar exam grading scale of 1-6). After completing the grading, we 
provided each student with his or her completed rubric, and reviewed the quiz 
in class. While the rubric did not include the answers, it was a transparent 
model of the order and type of analysis we were seeking. In order to “pass” 
a bar quiz, students had to earn an MEE score of at least a 3.55 If a student 
earned a 3 or higher the fi rst time she took the essay quiz, we bumped up her 
score by 0.5—in order to encourage students to put all of their eff ort into the 
fi rst attempt. Students who did not pass initially had to re-take the same quiz 
54. We also tinkered with the structure of the juries for this exercise. Size matters (or does it?): 
Does a twelve-person jury function diff erently than a six-person jury? What happens when 
you switch from unanimity to a supermajority rule for decision-making?
55. It is our understanding that in order to pass the MEE, bar takers must earn a combination 
of 3s and 4s on their essays. Presentation by former Arizona Supreme Court Justice Rebecca 
A. Berch.
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at a later date, again under exam-like conditions, having had the benefi t of 
reviewing their completed grading rubric. The highest score a student could 
get on a re-take was a 3. 
The integration of two subjects in our assessments honed analytical skills 
in a way that we hope will aid our students both on the bar exam and in 
practice. Through assessments, discussions, and exercises, the broad scope 
of the course pushed students to master contextual issue spotting. Since we 
usually did not identify the subject areas of these questions in advance, the 
students were forced to identify whether torts or civil procedure was being 
tested before drilling down into analysis. We taught them to next identify the 
particular subtopic being tested, and then to apply an IRAC analysis (for both 
multiple-choice and essay questions). This critical bar examination skill of 
identifying the subject being tested was thus introduced in the fi rst year, rather 
than the typical model of waiting until the third year or postgraduate bar prep. 
In addition, since most substantive law questions are raised through a specifi c 
procedural device, and most procedural questions will have to be introduced 
in the context of some type of substantive law, the ability to determine the area 
of law at issue is key to bar exam success. With this type of expertise, students 
are less likely to be distracted by the phrase “summary judgment” when the 
question is really about an intentional tort, or, conversely, by a substantive law 
background discussion when the pertinent issue actually involves procedure. 
In addition, this higher-level issue-spotting skill is of great value in law practice 
when more than one area of law applies to a client’s problem. 
Aside from the benefi ts of frequent feedback and opportunities for self-
assessment, the number of assessments and their scoring also aimed to 
develop student “grit.” Although defi ned in various ways in research and in 
Hollywood, grit is essentially the ability to persevere when faced with setbacks 
and challenges.56 Thus, “[g]rit entails working strenuously toward challenges, 
maintaining eff ort and interest over years despite failure, adversity, and plateaus 
in progress.”57 Research suggests that grit is sometimes more important than 
IQ for high achievement.58 By requiring students to re-take essay quizzes that 
scored below passing, we encouraged students to push through the inevitable 
failures of law school and reengage hard subjects. Students were encouraged 
to review their essays with the professors and TAs until they learned how to 
self-assess their essays.  Although not all students reached this goal, we did 
notice markedly better structural integrity on the fi nal essay exams, as well as 
on the other hypotheticals and exercises during the course. Finally, we also 
allowed students to “earn back” missed points on their weekly multiple-choice 
quizzes by answering a certain portion of practice multiple-choice question 
56. See generally Angela L. Duckworth, Christopher Peterson, Michael D. Matthews & Dennis R. 
Kelly, Grit: Perseverance and Passion for Long-Term Goals, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1087, 
1087–88 (2007).
57. Id. at 1088.
58. Id . at 1089; see also generally ANGELA DUCKWORTH, GRIT: THE POWER OF PASSION AND 
PERSEVERANCE (2016).
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quizzes correctly. This encouraged them to do more practice questions than 
they otherwise would have on their own and to take them seriously.
E.  Too Big to Fail
An unexpected benefi t of the course was that the number of credits allotted 
to it (fi ve per semester), and the fact that we spent so much time in class with 
our students, heightened the level of attention students paid to the course. In 
fact, the course almost had a “homeroom” feel to it, and we got to know our 
students very well. We also had the time and the opportunity to create more 
links between topics covered in contiguous classes. On the down side, because 
of the high number of credits, the grades in this course had a disproportionate 
impact on students’ fi rst-year grade point averages—and thus their ability to 
achieve or retain a particular class rank, retain their scholarships, and remain 
in good academic standing. Although the fi nal grade in each course was based 
on many factors (and not just a single fi nal exam), its disproportionate impact 
is still a concern. One possible solution to this problem is to award four credits 
for the substantive portion of the course and one credit for the “practicum” 
portion.
Finally, another area of both opportunity and challenge was that we had to 
create materials to teach this course. Since we wanted to avoid students having 
to purchase two separate casebooks, we created a custom casebook through 
Aspen’s Custom Publishing Series (quickly combining materials from other 
texts).59  While putting parts of multiple casebooks together in the same text—
with minimal editing—served our purposes starting out, the course would work 
better and be less demanding of faculty if we had more nuanced materials. 
V.  The Future of Civil Litigation: To Form a More Perfect Union
If anything here has piqued your interest, we urge those of you willing and able 
to jump fully into the innovation of a combined course, with its potentialities 
and risks, to take the leap. But the good news is that even for teachers who 
are unconvinced that such an approach is preferable, or constrained by the 
curricular structures of their institutions, many of the benefi ts described 
above can be realized without formal integration of the courses. Indeed, one 
of the most pleasurable and exciting consequences of our journey has been 
coordinating closely with colleagues and learning from one another. In a law 
school whose fi rst-year curriculum follows the traditional model, torts and 
civil procedure professors can work together to include readings and exercises 
59. INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE I (Laura G. Dooley & Brigham A. Fordham 
eds. 2014) (including excerpts from STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2012); 
WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 2009); Krieger 
& Neumann, supra note 33; JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS (7th ed. 
2007); ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND PROBLEMS 
(3d ed. 2010); INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE II (Laura G. Dooley & Brigham 
A. Fordham eds., 2d ed. 2015) (containing excerpts from the above-mentioned Farnsworth 
and Yeazell texts, as well as unpublished materials from one of the authors of this article, 
Brigham Fordham).
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in their respective courses that serve to cross-pollinate the learning process and 
lead to the benefi ts we have witnessed. And even a lone wolf can use many of 
these ideas in a traditional torts or procedure course to help deepen students’ 
understanding in ways that improve both bar preparation and practice.
The marriage of torts and civil procedure works (to the extent it does work) 
because of the connections and comparisons that naturally manifest in litigating 
a torts case. To emulate and teach this, we have used a mix of materials from 
torts and civil procedure casebooks, exercises that we have developed ourselves, 
and pleadings from litigated cases. Our decision to use a custom casebook was 
to some degree borne of a limited time frame to structure the course, and of 
our desire to ensure that our new structure would not undercut our students’ 
exposure to all the key coverage they should rightly expect from their fi rst-year 
torts and civil procedure courses. We routinely supplemented the materials in 
the custom casebook, which borrowed materials from traditional casebooks 
in wide use in the academy, with exercises and questions that we produced or 
that were available in the public domain via bar examiners’ websites and the 
like. 
This, as might be imagined, turned out to be a lot of work, and led to some 
challenges. We have contemplated what would improve the course: a casebook 
that integrates torts and civil procedure from page one. This book would 
deliberately infuse adult learning theory by focusing on context-based, active 
learning and frequent formative assessment. It would, for example, introduce 
civil litigation as a body of law that is both strategic and doctrinal, ordered by 
processes and doctrines that derive from our federal system of government. It 
would gather cases that—either in one opinion or through case history—teach 
compatible torts and civil procedure topics using the same fact pattern. And it 
would include problems and exercises that help students connect past topics 
to new ones as they complete activities pulled directly from contemporary law 
practice. 
Would such a casebook fi nd a wider audience? Legal publishers would 
be understandably hesitant to support a book that is made for such a 
nontraditional course. While there may be some ways around this market 
challenge, it refl ects a larger problem facing legal education: Dramatic shifts in 
the law school curriculum are easy to imagine but hard to execute. Particularly 
when attempting to rethink the fi rst year, we are, to some extent, held hostage 
by history. The myriad casebooks are keyed to the standard fi rst-year courses; 
students tend to expect the usual courses and their venerable casebooks; 
and the small, uncertain market to teach radically diff erent courses creates a 
powerful disincentive for faculty to invest time in developing such courses. 
The tail of tradition wags the curricular dog.
For us, the answer to this market failure is blind persistence and (perhaps 
unfounded) optimism. We started our noble experiment in the hope that we 
could better prepare our students for the practice of law. We found, to our 
delight, that it also made us better professors. This happy consequence was 
not inevitable. Simply combining two traditional subjects without thoughtful 
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integration would no doubt have been less work, but also would have done 
little to open our own eyes to the pedagogic possibilities. Signifi cantly, we 
were pushed to look beyond our individual ways of thinking about the legal 
universe to embrace a broader perspective. Of course, the experiment is 
ongoing. We invite you to join us in our eff orts to make law school a more 
realistic and deeper experience for today’s law student.
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